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CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6.
In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend ... and be confronted with the
witnesses against him.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
... be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Cintron 34
(decided January 11, 1990)
A criminal defendant, convicted of attempted rape, attempted
sodomy and sexual abuse of a four year old child, contended that
his right to confront witnesses as provided under the state35 and
federal36 constitutions was violated when the trial court permitted
the complaining child witness, pursuant to article 65 of the state's
Criminal Procedure Law, to testify outside of the physical pres-
ence of the defendant. 37 The court of appeals reversed
defendant's conviction, holding that while the statute was
constitutional on its face, it was unconstitutional as applied to the
defendant. 38
Article 65 of the state's Criminal Procedure Law39 permits
children under the age of twelve, offered as witnesses in criminal
proceedings regarding sexual misconduct, the opportunity to tes-
tify in a separate "testimonial room" which is detached from the
courtroom. The purpose of this statute, according to the state
34. 75 N.Y.2d 249, 551 N.E.2d 561, 552 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1990).
35. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 253, 551 N.E.2d at 563, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
38. Id. at 266, 551 N.E.2d at 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
39. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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legislature, is to shield the child from severe mental or emotional
harm that may accompany testifying in the presence of the
defendant and "in the public atmosphere of the courtroom con-
cerning the intimate sexual details of the crime."40 If a child is
permitted to testify in this fashion, the statute provides the use of
a live two-way closed-circuit television which allows both the de-
fendant and the child witness to simultaneously view each
other, 41 thus purporting to preserve the defendant's constitutional
right to confront his or her witnesses. 42
Before a child is permitted to give transmitted testimony out-
side of the actual presence of the defendant, the court must make
two findings as required by section 65.20(5).43 First, the court
must determine if the child is a "vulnerable witness. "'44 To be a
vulnerable witness, section 65.10(1)45 requires the court to de-
termine by clear and convincing evidence that "as a result of ex-
traordinary circumstances, ... [the] child... will suffer severe
mental or emotional harm if required to testify" in the courtroom
and that testifying outside of the courtroom by "live, two-way
closed-circuit television . . . will help prevent, or diminish the
likelihood... of such harm. "'46 If this finding is made, the court
will permit the child to testify in the testimony room but also
allow the criminal defendant and his or her attorney to be present
in the same room. 47 Second, if it is found that the child wll
likely suffer from extreme mental or emotional harm if forced to
testify in the presence of the defendant, the court can order the
defendant and attorney to be present in the courtroom while the
40. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 254, 551 N.E.2d at 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
41. Id. at 254 n.2, 551 N.E.2d at 564 n.2, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 71 n.2 (citing
N.Y. CIM. PRoc. LAW § 65.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
42. Id. at 254, 551 N.E.2d at 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 71.
43. N.Y. CGi. PRoc. LAW § 65.20(5) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
44. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 254, 551 N.E.2d at 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 71
(citing N.Y. CRI. PROC. LAW § 65.20(1), (10) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).
45. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 65.10(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
46. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 254, 551 N.E.2d at 564, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 71
(emphasis in original) (quoting N.Y. CRi PRoc. LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney
Supp. 1991)).
47. Id. at 261, 551 N.E.2d at 568, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
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child testifies in the testimonial room. 48 Under article 65, either
party, or the trial court itself, can move for a declaration that the
child witness be permitted to testify by use of the two-way
closed-circuit television. 49 This motion can be raised prior to
trial5° or during the trial. 51 If the motion is raised prior to trial,
the court is required to hold a hearing to determine whether the
child meets the requirements of section 65.20(5). If the motion is
raised during trial, according to section 65.20(10), the trial court
"may make a determination 'from its own observations' that a
witness is suffering severe mental or emotional harm." 52
In the case at bar, the trial court ruled pursuant to section
65.20(10) that the victim, now five years old, be allowed to tes-
tify by live closed-circuit two-way television. The court based its
ruling on several observations of the child while testifying before
the court. The court observed that she was unable to articulate
any verbal responses and found that she could only communicate
by shaking her head. The court also noticed that after looking at
the defendant, "she was extremely reluctant to take the stand." 53
At this point during the trial, the court directed that the defen-
dant and jury be excused from the courtroom so that the court
could observe the child outside of the defendant's presence.
While able to respond to questions, the court noted that she still
could not verbalize her responses. After bringing back the defen-
dant and jury, the court directed that the child could testify as an
unsworn witness. 54 While testifying, the court noticed that when
48. Id. at 261, 551 N.E.2d at 568-59, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 75-76 (citing N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.30(5) (McKinney Supp. 1991)). The court of appeals
added that section 65.30(5) directs that the "defendant's counsel must remain
in the courtroom unless the court is satisfied that counsel's presence in the
testimonial room will not encourage the jury to draw any adverse inference or
impede the defendant's ability to communicate freely with his attorney." Id.
49. Id. at 255, 551 N.E.2d at 565, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 72.
50. Id.; see N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
51. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 255, 551 N.E.2d at 565, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 72;
N.Y. CPJM. PRoc. LAW § 65.20(10) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
52. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 255, 551 N.E.2d at 565, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 72
(quoting N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 65.20(10) (McKinney Supp. 1991)).




et al.: Confrontation Clause
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
the prosecutor blocked her view of the defendant, she "became
more communicative." 55 When asked by the prosecutor if the
defendant scared her, she "no added affirmatively." 56
Additionally, when asked to demonstrate what occurred between
the defendant and her by use of anatomically correct dolls, she
"remained unresponsive. ",57
At the close of her testimony, the prosecution moved for the
court to declare the child a "vulnerable" child witness, thus al-
lowing subsequent testimony to be given by closed-circuit televi-
sion.58 Over the defendant's objection, the court granted the mo-
tion.
On appeal, the defendant contended that article 65 is facially
unconstitutional under both state and federal confrontation provi-
sions, claiming that each provision "permits nothing less than
total eye-to-eye confrontation in defendant's physical pres-
ence." 59 Alternatively, he contended that if the court of appeals
determines that article 65 is constitutional on its face, then the
trial judge misapplied its provisions during his trial.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's first contention,
holding that article 65 is constitutional on its face. 60 To uphold
the constitutionality of the statute, however, the court found that
the trial court's determination of vulnerability based upon its
subjective observations of the child, as permitted under section
65.20(10), did not provide sufficient evidence to allow infringe-
ment of defendant's confrontation rights. The court, therefore,
incorporated "the clear and convincing" burden of proof,
described in section 65.10(1), as an additional requirement to a




58. Id. at 256-57, 551 N.E.2d at 566, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 73. Under article
65, both the prosecution and defense can either declare the child a vulnerable
witness by formal motion made prior to trial pursuant to section 65.20(l), or
both can make such a motion during the trial pursuant to section 65.20(10).
N.Y. CRzm. PRoc. LAW § 65.20(l), (10) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
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section 65.20(10).61 In this case, the court of appeals reversed
the defendant's conviction and ordered a new trial since the trial
court's finding of vulnerability was based solely upon its
subjective observations of the child.
The court began its analysis by rejecting defendant's interpre-
tation of Coy v. Iowa,62 a United States Supreme Court case, as
conferring upon the criminal defendant unfettered rights to con-
front his or her witnesses. In that case, the Supreme Court invali-
dated an Iowa statute, which was similarly enacted to protect the
complaining child witness from the trauma of testifying in the
presence of a defendant, because its provisions failed to ade-
quately protect the defendant's confrontation rights. 63
The Supreme Court offered two reasons why the Iowa statute
failed to pass constitutional muster. First, the Court found that
the defendant's right "to meet face to face all those who appear
and give evidence at trial" was abridged because the screen
erected between the child witness and defendant, after adjusting
the courtroom lights, effectively blocked the defendant's view of
the child and totally blocked the child's view of the defendant. 64
Second, the Court held that the state's "legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma" placed upon the child witness was not
specific enough to further the state's interest of protecting the
child from emotional harm, and therefore failed to override the
more compelling sixth amendment right. 65 The Court added in
dicta, however, that a criminal defendant's confrontation rights
were not absolute, 66 proposing that such an infringement could
61. Id. at 262-63, 551 N.E.2d at 569-70, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 76-77.
62. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Id. at 1015, 1021 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
65. Id.
66. Justice O'Connor, concurring with the majority, wrote separately to
elaborate on her view that a criminal defendant's confrontation rights are not
absolute and may give way to the state interest of protecting the child witness
from courtroom trauma. Id. at 1022 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Justice
further noted that state statutes such as New York's article 65 provision, which
permit two-way closed-circuit television, "may raise no substantial
Confrontation Clause problem since they involve testimony in the presence of
250 [Vol 8
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be constitutionally permissible if enacted by the state to "further
an important public policy." 67
According to the court of appeals, this dicta provided authority
that a criminal defendant's confrontation rights could be constitu-
tionally infringed upon. Comparing the two statutes, the court
determined that the New York statute did not possess the infirmi-
ties found in the Iowa statute and therefore concluded that the
former would meet the constraints imposed by Coy. 68
The court noted that article 65 differed from the Iowa statute in
two respects. First, article 65 calls for two-way closed-circuit
television transmission which allows both the defendant and child
witness to see each other as opposed to the Iowa statute, which
permitted only the defendant to see a silhouette of the child.
Second, the New York provision requires the trial court to make
an individualized showing, demonstrated by clear and convincing
evidence, that the child witness would likely suffer severe mental
or emotional harm. 69 The Iowa statute's method of imputing by
law a presumption of child trauma was too arbitrary to permit in-
fringement of the defendant's confrontation rights.
To safeguard against such possibilities, the court of appeals
determined that the clear and convincing burden of proof stated
in section 65.10(1) must be read into section 65.20(10) so as to
adequately protect defendant's confrontation rights. The court
found that this standard of proof requires the trial record to show
legal proof from which an appellate court could determine
whether the trial court's finding of severe mental or emotional
harm was supported by clear and convincing evidence. 70 The
court noted that this legal proof could come in the form of testi-
mony from either the child's mother, family members, or the
child's psychotherapist. The court cautioned, however, that the
statute does not require a separate hearing nor expert testimony to
the defendant." Id. at 1023 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1021.
68. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 258-60, 551 N.E.2d at 567-68, 552 N.Y.S.2d
at 74-75.
69. Id. at 260, 551 N.E.2d at 568, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
70. Id. at 263, 551 N.E.2d at 570, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 77.
1991]
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determine whether an article 65 order is proper. 71
In this case, the court determined that the trial court's own
factual findings were insufficient to satisfy the clear and convinc-
ing standard of proof. According to the court, "[i]ndications that
the child was afraid of the defendant and could testify more read-
ily in his absence, while consistent with the likelihood that the
child will suffer 'severe mental or emotional harm,' simply do
not prove it" by clear and convincing evidence. 72 In Cintron, the
court of appeals, interpreting Coy, found that article 65 satisfied
the minimum criteria necessary to pass federal constitutional
muster. The defendant in Cintron, however, brought both state
and federal constitutional claims. As the court did not separately
analyze the statute under the state constitution, it may be implied
that the statute passes state constitutional muster.
Subsequently, the federal equivalent was recently reinterpreted
by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig.73 In
Craig, the Supreme Court held that a Maryland statute which
permitted a child witness to testify by one-way closed-circuit
television was constitutional. Under this statute, the one-way
transmission allows the defendant to see the child witness testify,
but does not allow the child to see the defendant. Rather than de-
velop a strict test, the Craig Court determined that a case by case
analysis was preferable in this area. Because article 65 provides
for two-way transmission of the child witness testimony, the
statute provides less infringement of the defendant's confrontation
rights than the one found constitutional in Craig. Until the court
of appeals is called upon to decide whether a lesser statutory re-
quirement would pass muster under the state constitution, it is
uncertain whether the state constitution itself offers greater pro-
tection to the defendant.
Judge Alexander concurred with the majority view that article
65 is constitutional on its face in regard to a defendant's right to
confront his or her witnesses. He stated, however, that the
majority failed to address the issue of whether article 65
71. Id. at 265, 551 N.E.2d at 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
72. Id. at 266, 551 N.E.2d at 571, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
73. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
252 [Vol 8
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adequately protects the defendant's confrontation rights in regard
to allowing the child witness to testify outside of the actual
presence of the trier of fact. 74 The judge believed that use of
televised testimony unconstitutionally impairs the ability of the
jury to properly "assess the demeanor and credibility of a
vulnerable child witness." 75
Judge Alexander, pointing to some of the perception deficien-
cies that accompany televised testimony, stated that
[w]hile a television monitor conveys the image of the testifying
witness to the jury, the color and sound may not be true, the
witness' voice may be distorted, minor background noises may
be magnified so as to create significant distractions and other
distractions such as the child witness playing with a microphone
may result from the procedure itself.76
The judge also cautioned that studies have shown that juries
have a tendency to find televised testimony to be more credible
than that of in court testimony. 77 Lastly, the judge believed that
such testimony prohibits the trier of fact from watching a
witness' body movements, thus diminishing the ability of the trier
of fact to discover subtle gestures which may uncover signs that
the witness is not telling the truth.78 According to the judge,
problems associated with televised testimony are violative of
defendant's confrontation rights and would therefore render
article 65 unconstitutional. 79
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Bellacosa disagreed with the
majority, contending that the trial judge's subjective observations
74. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d at 268, 551 N.E.2d at 572, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 79
(Alexander, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 268, 551 N.E.2d at 573, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 80 (Alexander, J.,
concurring).
76. Id. at 271, 551 N.E.2d at 575, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (Alexander, J.,
concurring).
77. Id. (Alexander, J., concurring) (citing Hocheiser v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 787, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279 (Cal. App. Dep't Super.
Ct. 1984)).
78. Id. at 272, 551 N.E.2d at 575, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 82 (Alexander, J.,
concurring).
79. Id. (Alexander, J., concurring).
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satisfied the clear and convincing evidence requirement of article
65. He noted that the trial judge is in the best position to docu-
ment the child witness' psychological state for purposes of de-
termining whether he or she should testify by closed-circuit tele-
vision. In this case, the judge would have upheld the defendant's
conviction, noting that the trial judge documented ample evidence
that the child was eligible for article 65 protection. 80
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Henderson 81
(decided April 16, 1990)
The defendant, convicted of sodomy in the first degree, sexual
abuse in the first degree and endangering the welfare of a child,
asserted that her right to confront witnesses as guaranteed under
both the state82 and federal83 constitutions was violated when the
trial judge permitted, pursuant to article 65 of the state's
Criminal Procedure Law, 84 two complaining child witnesses to
testify by live two-way closed circuit television. While noting
that the court of appeals recently held that article 65 contains
sufficient safeguards to withstand a facial challenge on con-
frontation clause grounds, the second department held that as
applied to the defendant, it was violative of his confrontation
rights. 85
Prior to defendant's trial, the court, pursuant to section 65.20
of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, 86 granted the prose-
80. Id, at 272-76, 551 N.E.2d at 575-78, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 82-85
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
81. 156 A.D.2d 92, 554 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 736, 557 N.E.2d 1194, 558 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1990).
82. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
84. N.Y. CRiM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-.30 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
85. Henderson, 156 A.D.2d at 97, 554 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
86. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 65.20 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
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